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Book Reviews
Michael D. Gibson, Book Review Editor
Herbert Hoover: A Public Life, by David Burner. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 1979. pp. xii, 433. Preface, sources, notes, acknowl-
edgements, index, photographs. $15.95.
New insights into the public life and service of Herbert Hoover that
sharply challenge accepted myths are provided in David Burner's bi-
ography of the much maligned thirty-first president. The persistence
of these myths can be largely attributed to intellectual biases, the mis-
taken assumption that Hoover was an arch conservative, and the fact
that Hoover's personal papers were not available for research prior to
1963.
During the last decade a new generation of historians, including
Joan Hoff Wilson, Ellis Hawley, and William Appleman Williams,
have used the Hoover Papers to produce articles and books which
have provided new appreciations of Hoover's public philosophy and
the Hoover presidency. Burner, while remaining objective and de-
tached, marshalls an impressive body of proof that Hoover was an
active, progressive-minded chief executive.
As Secretary of Commerce during the 1920s, Hoover had led in the
promotion of many progressive reforms. He tried to interest Coolidge
in federally sponsored old age pensions; pushed for tax reform that
would place heavier taxes on large income and inheritances; and was
one of the prime movers in abolishing the twelve-hour day in the steel
industry. Republican leaders of the Old Guard were outraged and
desperately tried to prevent his nomination in 1928.
Hoover also made enemies in certain business and financial circles
by repeatedly urging, from 1925 onward, that the Federal Reserve
Board take firm measures to discourage stock market speculation. The
ominous implications of this antagonism were not immediately appar-
ent, but they foreshadowed a lack of cooperation which was to plague
the administration, literally, into its final hours.
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One of Hoover's first actions as president, two days after inaugura-
tion, was to meet with Federal Reserve officials to explore ways of
curbing speculation. The president also sent Henry M. Robinson to
warn the larger banks, hoping to solicit pledges of restraint. In May he
appealed to the president of the New York Stock Exchange and to gov-
ernor Franklin D. Roosevelt to regulate and reform market practices.
Neither had responded when the crash came in October.
Later, speaking from the advantage of hindsight, critics would point
to Hoover's hesitancy in adopting massive relief programs at an early
point in his administration. Nevertheless, the president's response was
immediate and precedent shattering. For the first time the federal gov-
ernment intervened directly in a financial crisis. A conference of
labor, financial, and industrial leaders was convened and agreed to
four principles: no strikes, no wage cuts, the adoption of work sharing
whenever possible, and employers would take care of their employees
as best they could. The Federal Farm Board, which Hoover had been
instrumental in creating, bought agricultural products to maintain
price levels and made crop production loans.
Later would come a moratorium on international debts and admin-
istration-sponsored legislation to establish a Home Loan Bank Board
and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. After initial resistance
by an obstructionist, politically motivated Congress, most of these
measures were continued and expanded during the New Deal. In 1974
Rexford Tugwell, one of FDR's most visionary planners, would
acknowledge that "We didn't admit it at the time, but practically the
whole New Deal was extrapolated from programs that Hoover
started."
If this is so, why did Hoover "fail" and what were the nature of his
failings? One of Burner's more interesting contributions is his attempt
to assess the effect of Hoover's unique background and experiences on
the conduct of his administration. Interesting insights into Hoover's
hesitancy to adopt more dramatic measures at an earlier date are
offered.
Burner points to an over reliance on voluntarism—local efforts to
provide jobs and basic necessities—as one of the keys to understand- •
ing the administration's "failure." Another key concerns Hoover's per-
sonality and the Quaker ethic that shaped it. Hoover recognized the
importance of reassuring the public; but his Quaker upbringing pre-
vented him from any unseemly attempts at self-promotion, rendering
his attempts to rouse public confidence colorless and psychologically
ineffective.
This reading of the Quaker influence and its impact deserves further
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exploration. Unfortunately, the concluding chapter, in which many
loose ends might have been brought together, does not adequately
come to grips with this or any of the other paradoxical elements in
Hoover's personality, public philosophy and service. Even so. Burner
makes some significant contributions in suggesting an approach that is
useful in interpreting Hoover's response to the depression, and in pro-
viding many intriguing points of departure for more thorough studies
of a crucial presidency.
Hoover's belief in voluntarism and the mobilization of local efforts
to provide relief may have been overly naive; but it must also be seen
as proceeding from his world war experiences with the growth of giant
bureaucracies and his resulting concern for the future. He was con-
vinced that large-scale dependence on government assistance could
not be discarded once the crisis had passed. As historian William
Appleman Williams has pointed out: "Hoover told us that if we (the
neighbors of the stricken) cannot be roused to provide such help, and
the way the government helps them . . . is not handled very carefully
. . . there will be hell to pay . . . bureaucratic stateism that would de-
value the human beings it claims to save . . . We now know these
were legitimate fears."
Dale C. Mayer
Hoover Presidential Library
West Branch, IA
Order upon the Land: The U.S. Rectangular Land Survey and the
Upper Mississippi Country, by Hildegard Binder Johnson. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1976. pp. 268. Illustrations, maps
notes, $9.00.
Hildegarde Binder Johnson, for many years a distinguished profes-
sor of historical geography at Macalester College, has poured years of
research and thought into this tight (242 pages of text) monograph on
the upper Mississippi Country. The scene is that stretch of hills and
valleys on either side of the Great River from Clinton (Iowa) to within
sight of Minneapolis-St. Paul. Narrow at its southern and northern
points, it is up to 140 miles in the vicinity of Madison (Wisconsin),
and includes portions of the present states of Illinois, Iowa, Wiscon-
sin, and Minnesota. The themes are the nature and texture of the land,
and the impact of the rectangular survey system on the pattems of set-
tlement and economic exploitation. The author writes of the book's
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